4 Oligopoly
Understand how oligopolists anticipate rivals, analyze strategic choices, and compare quantity competition, price competition, and collusion.
An is a market dominated by a small number of firms. Its defining feature is : each firm’s profits depend not only on its own price, output, and other choices, but also on how rivals respond. For instance, an airline deciding whether to add flights must consider whether competitors will add capacity, cut fares, or improve service.
The number of firms alone does not determine a single outcome. Oligopolies can range from intense competition to coordinated behavior.
Analyzing strategic choices
analyzes choices whose payoffs depend on what other decision-makers do. In a simple game, firms are the players, their possible actions are strategies, and each combination of actions produces profits, or payoffs.
A is a firm’s most profitable choice given its rival’s choice. A is best regardless of the rival’s action. A occurs when every firm is choosing a , so no firm can gain by changing its choice alone. A need not maximize the firms’ combined profits.
A pricing game and the
Consider a pricing game in which each firm can maintain a high price or cut its price. Payoffs are shown as (Firm A, Firm B) in arbitrary profit units:
If Firm A maintains a high price and Firm B maintains a high price, the payoff is .
If Firm A maintains a high price and Firm B cuts its price, the payoff is .
If Firm A cuts its price and Firm B maintains a high price, the payoff is .
If both firms cut their prices, the payoff is .
For either firm, cutting price earns more whether the rival maintains a high price or cuts. Both firms therefore choose to cut, producing the . Yet both would earn more at if they could sustain high prices. This tension between joint gains from cooperation and individual incentives to compete is the logic often used to explain behavior.
Quantity, price, and output choices
When a firm considers increasing output, it compares the revenue from extra sales with the associated costs. In an , it must also consider that greater total market output may lower the market price, and that rivals may respond by changing their own output or prices.
Different models focus on different strategic choices:
In , firms choose quantities, often simultaneously, while taking rivals’ quantities into account. Each firm’s best output depends on the output it expects rivals to produce.
In , firms choose prices. Under the simplest model’s restrictive assumptions—identical products, identical constant marginal costs, and enough capacity to serve demand—price competition can push price down to marginal cost. Product differentiation, capacity limits, or other market features can change this result.
In , firms coordinate to restrict total output and raise price, seeking profits closer to those of a monopoly. A is a group of firms that coordinates in this way.
How model assumptions affect outcomes
The choice of strategic variable can produce different model predictions. Suppose market demand is
where is total industry output, and each firm has constant marginal cost of .
If a firm acts jointly with a rival as a monopolist, they choose total output , giving a price of .
Under the standard symmetric Cournot model with two firms, each produces about units. Total output is about , and price is about .
Under the simple Bertrand assumptions, price is and market demand is .
These are model predictions, not universal outcomes. Actual results depend on firms’ costs, products, capacity, timing, and expectations about rival responses.
and ongoing competition
can increase firms’ combined profits by holding down output or raising prices. However, each participant has an incentive to sell more than its agreed share while the others maintain the higher price.
If firms expect to compete repeatedly, the possibility of detecting and responding to a deviation can affect their choices today. Repeated interaction does not guarantee cooperation. Firms may also compete through capacity, quality, advertising, or innovation rather than price.
Antitrust limits on agreements
In the United States, competitor agreements to fix prices, rig bids, or allocate customers or markets are illegal under federal antitrust law. A firm’s independent pricing decision is not, by itself, proof of an agreement; legal assessment depends on the conduct and evidence.